La contre-offensive menée par l’armée nigériane contre Boko Haram à partir de 2015 a entraîné une catastrophe sanitaire parmi les populations civiles déplacées. Cette catastrophe n’a été reconnue que difficilement, après qu’une alliance instable se soit progressivement forgée entre certains acteurs nationaux – politiques et militaires – et certains acteurs humanitaires internationaux pour formuler et s’accorder sur le diagnostic d’une « crise humanitaire » et essayer d’y remédier. Cela a ainsi permis de rendre visibles certaines dimensions du conflit tout en en invisibilisant d’autres, à commencer par la brutalité de la contre-insurrection de l’armée nigériane.

This article seeks to document and analyse violence affecting the provision of healthcare by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and its intended beneficiaries in the early stage of the current civil war in South Sudan. Most NGO accounts and quantitative studies of violent attacks on healthcare tend to limit interpretation of their prime motives to the violation of international norms and deprivation of access to health services. Instead, we provide a detailed narrative, which contextualises violent incidents affecting healthcare, with regard for the dynamics of conflict in South Sudan as well as MSF’s operational decisions, and which combines and contrasts institutional and academic sources with direct testimonies from local MSF personnel and other residents. This approach offers greater insight not only into the circumstances and logics of violence but also into the concrete ways in which healthcare practices adapt in the face of attacks and how these may reveal and put to the test the reciprocal expectations binding international and local health practitioners in crisis situations.

This article discusses the policy of absolute secrecy on abductions adopted by aid organisations. It argues that the information blackout on past and current cases is to a large extent a function of the growing role of private security companies in the aid sector, which promote a ‘pay, don’t say’ policy as a default option, whatever the situation. The article contends that secrecy is as much an impediment to resolving current cases as it is to preventing and managing future ones. It suggests abandoning the policy of strict confidentiality in all circumstances – a policy that is as dangerous as it is easy to apply – in favour of a more nuanced and challenging approach determining how much to publicise ongoing and past cases for each audience, always keeping in mind the interests of current and potential hostages.

What turns ordinary men into killers? The CRASH team invited you to a conference – debate with the sociologist and historian, Nicolas Mariot. This meeting, prepared with Claudine Vidal, was moderated by Elba Rahmouni.

Dans l'émission Du grain à moudre d'été, sur France Culture, Michaël Neuman et François Frison-Roche répondent aux questions de Julie Gacon sur la possibilité d'une résolution politique du conflit entre le gouvernement yéménite et les rebelles houthis après l'annonce en juillet dernier du retrait des Emirats arabes unis. Les invités apportent un éclairage sur les intérêts divergents qui animent les différents acteurs du confit, notamment l’Arabie saoudite et l’Iran, et donnent à voir l'articulation entre économie de guerre et aide humanitaire.  

In 2016, the Operations Department commissioned a critical review of the operations carried out between 2015 and 2016 in Borno State by MSF France in the north east of Nigeria. In response, and with the help of Epicentre, Judith Soussan and Fabrice Weissman from CRASH produced a detailed historical account of the analyses made of the situation by the teams, capital and headquarters at the time, as well as the objectives they set themselves, the actions they undertook, the obstacles they encountered and the results they achieved.  As part of this project, some of the directors and operations managers who had been involved in these operations took a retrospective look at their own practices: were they late in responding to the catastrophic situation in the IDP camps in rural areas and on the outskirts of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, in 2016 and, if so, why?  What conclusions can be drawn a posteriori about the operational choices made and the effectiveness of MSF intervention strategies? And, to take things a step further, what does this experience teach us about how MSF functions and how our teams work? Interview with Isabelle Defourny, Operations Director at MSF-OCP. By Elba Rahmouni. 

The rehabilitation of international humanitarian law (IHL) has become a priority for those who think that the horrors of contemporary wars are largely due to the blurring of the distinction between civilians and combatants and for those who think that campaigning for the respect of IHL could result in more civilised wars. Similarly, respect for humanitarian principles is still seen by many as the best tool available to protect the safety of aid workers. In this text, I argue that both assumptions are misled. The distinction between civilians and combatants, a cornerstone of IHL, has been blurred in practice since the late nineteenth century. In addition, humanitarian agencies claiming to be ‘principled’ have been victims of attacks as much as others. History and current practice tell us that neither IHL nor humanitarian principles provide safety or can guide our decisions. Accepting their symbolic value, rather than their unrealised potential to protect and solve operational dilemmas, would free humanitarian agencies from endless speculations.

The situation in Yemen is often presented as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, long ignored by the media, and requiring assistance vital to the survival of almost the entire country. Cholera outbreaks, famine, and destruction are invoked to support that argument. In reality, however, the situation of the country’s 25 to 30 million inhabitants is impossible to know with any accuracy. Nor do we know exactly what is happening in Yemen in terms of aid, although the amount of funding is very large. Noting these diagnoses and its field teams’ perspective on certain points, Médecins Sans Frontières has launched an effort to better understand this field of action using a quantitative and qualitative approach. A review of aid organisation documents and a series of interviews with aid actors in Yemen – in Houthi areas, in particular – has yielded a number of different conclusions.

Bernard Kouchner est l’un des fondateurs de Médecins Sans Frontières puis de Médecins du monde. Rony Brauman est actuellement directeur d’études au CRASH, il a été président de Médecins Sans Frontières de 1982 à 1994. Dans ce débat, ils discutent les notions de droit d’ingérence, de droit humanitaire international et de sécurité mondiale. Ce débat, qui a eu lieu le 19 juin 2019 au Palais Bourbon, a été organisé par Daniel Lagot, président de l’ADIF et l’association PUGWASH, avec le soutien de PANGEE ONG. 

In the eyes of Rony Brauman of Médecins sans Frontières, wars are always triggered in the name of morality. Today’s “humanitarian” interventions are little more than new moral crusades – and their justifications are based on lies. 

Un ouvrage propose une synthèse sur le génocide des Tutsis en 1994, depuis le début de la guerre jusqu’à la mise en place de la politique mémorielle. Au-delà, il retrace l’histoire du Rwanda sur le temps long du XXe siècle, en insistant sur les constructions coloniales et ethniques.

Theaters of war, genocide, mass crimes, Syria, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are at the heart of the international symposium organized by the platform L’humanitaire dans la globalisation of the Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH) and the Centre de Réflexion sur l'Action et les Savoirs Humanitaires (CRASH) of Médecins Sans Frontières. This symposium is part of the commemoration by these two institutions of the 25 years of the genocide of Rwandan Tutsis.